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Abstract
Identity-Based cryptography has been proposed in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) to provide security.
However, the ﬁgure of the Private Key Generator (PKG) is not adequate in the MANET setting, since it
may not be reachable by all nodes, can fail during the life-time of the protocol or can even be attacked,
compromising the whole system. Previous works distribute the task of the PKG among a set of nodes by
means of a secret sharing scheme.
In this paper we propose an eﬃcient solution to emulate in a dynamic and distributed way the role of the
PKG in so that even new nodes joining the network are able to issue shares of the master key of an Identity-
Based scheme. In this way, the distributed PKG spreads dynamically among the nodes as the network
increases. Furthermore, the techniques we propose may be suitable for other protocols over MANETs.
Keywords: mobile ad-hoc networks, ID-based schemes, secret sharing schemes
1 Introduction
A mobile ad-hoc network (also known as MANET) is a self-organized wireless net-
work of mobile nodes without any ﬁxed infrastructure. Therefore, the network
topology may change rapidly and unpredictably.
1 This author is partly supported by the Catalan Government under grant 2005 SGR 00446, and by the
Spanish Ministry of Science and Education through project SEG2004-04352-C04-01 “PROPRIETAS”.
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Security in MANETs is raising a lot of interest, since some of its characteristics,
such as lack of infrastructure, absence of a trusted third party or constraints in the
communication channel and the mobile devices themselves, (for instance, energy
constraints) make it diﬃcult to secure.
Traditional public key infrastructure is hardly implementable in MANETs, since
even if the tasks of a Certiﬁcate Authority are emulated or distributed by some
nodes in the network, the access to the certiﬁcates is extremely costly and diﬃcult
to guarantee and should include frequent broadcasts of lists of revoked users.
Recent works proposed the use of Identity Based schemes, in which the public
key of a user is a well known aspect of its identity and thus the authenticity of
public keys is immediately guaranteed. Moreover, revocation can be implemented
adding an expiry date to the identity.
However, one of the main drawbacks of using ID-based cryptography in a mobile
ad-hoc network is the need of a Private Key Generator (in short, PKG).
We provide an eﬃcient solution to distribute in a dynamic way the role of the
PKG by conveniently using a bivariate polynomial to share the master key. There-
fore, this construction provides a solution to jointly perform the role of the PKG in
a mobile ad-hoc network.
Somehow, our techniques can be seen as a secret sharing scheme without a ﬁxed
set of nodes holding shares of a secret. We stress that, in our construction, the
secret does not change throughout the life-time of the MANET, independently if
new nodes are jointed or not. This point makes our construction especially suitable
for dynamically distribute the master key of the Identity-Based Scheme.
Note that in our scheme threshold property is not the goal, but a tool to initialize
a MANET with security, decentralized and allowing dynamism.
On top of all the natural features of Identity Based schemes, our proposal also
provides a non-interactive pairwise key agreement.
Summing up, with our proposal, we provide an eﬃcient solution of performing a
Private Key Generator in a MANET. The whole combination of eﬃciency, ID-based
feature and mobile ad-hoc network scenario have not been proposed before, up to
our knowledge.
1.1 Previous Work
Several works [9,10,5] stress suitability of ID-based schemes for securing ad-hoc
networks. Authors in [5,10] suggest emulating the public key generator by using a
(t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme in a similar way as in wired networks (see,
for example [8]). However this solution lacks of the required dynamism for a mobile
ad-hoc network. For example, at least t of the initial nodes that jointly play the role
of the public key generator must be reachable throughout the life of the MANET
for any new node joining the network.
On the other hand, Saxena et al., in [12], provide a solution that allows new
nodes to play the role of share distributors, but at the cost of a very interactive
procedure. This is hard to implement in MANETs as for example high energy
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consumption is needed for communications.
Actually, since the ﬁrst proposal relating threshold cryptography and mobile
ad-hoc networks [15], threshold secret sharing has been also used in other works for
securing ad-hoc networks [6,7] in a dynamic way. Furthermore, they show how to
construct threshold signatures in the dynamic scenario of a mobile ad-hoc network,
pointing out the possibility of extending their results to other cryptographic actions.
Recently, Saxena et al. [13] provide an eﬃcient admission protocol for ad-hoc
networks. They make use of similar secret sharing techniques as in our paper, but
their goal is to establish a pairwise key in a non-interactive way.
Outline of the paper: The rest of the paper is distributed as follows. Section
2 reviews some basic concepts on ID-based schemes and secret sharing schemes.
Our proposal for adapting the role of a PKG to a MANET is detailed in Section
3. Some applications that derive from our construction are described in Section 4.
Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we brieﬂy review some concepts that will be useful in the rest of the
paper. We begin by deﬁning ID-based schemes and ﬁxing some notation. After-
wards, we review some basics on secret sharing schemes.
2.1 ID-Based Schemes
In an identity-based encryption scheme, a pair master public key/ private key is
generated by the PKG. Once this master key is established, arbitrary identities
may be used as public keys for the scheme. When a sender wants to encrypt
a message for a recipient with identity ID, he only needs the master public key
and the identity ID. In order to decrypt a message, the user ID must obtain the
corresponding private key from the PKG.
More formally, an identity-based encryption scheme is speciﬁed by four proba-
bilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms (see for instance [2]):
– ID.Gen takes a security parameter k and returns the system parameters ID.pms
and master private key ID.msk. The system parameters include the master public
key and the description of sets M, C, which denote the set of messages and
ciphertexts respectively. ID.pms is publicly available, while ID.msk is kept secret
by the trusted authority.
– ID.Ext takes as inputs ID.pms, ID.msk and an arbitrary string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
returns a private key dID to the user with identity ID. This must be done over a
secure channel, since dID enables to decrypt ciphertexts under the identity ID.
– ID.Enc takes as inputs ID.pms, ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and M ∈M. It returns a ciphertext
C ∈ C.
– ID.Dec takes as inputs ID.pms, C ∈ C and a private key dID, and it returns
M ∈M or rejects.
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In this paper we will consider the Identity Based scheme proposed by Boneh
and Franklin in 2001 [2]. The system parameters are params = (q,G,G1, e, P, Ppub)
where G, G1 are groups of the same prime order q, Ppub = sP is the master public
key, s is the master secret key and e is an admissible pairing. Admissible pairings
are maps e : G×G → G1 with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
2. Non-degenerate: e(P,P ) = 1G1 for all P ∈ G
3. Computable: there exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for any
P,Q ∈ G.
2.2 Secret Sharing Schemes
The idea of secret sharing schemes was independently introduced by Shamir [14]
and Brickell [3]. Roughly speaking, the problem is to deal pieces, or shares, of a
secret among a set of parties so that some coalition of them can jointly reconstruct
it.
More formally, a secret sharing scheme is a method by means of which an special
ﬁgure, called usually dealer, shares a secret s among a set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of n
parties. Each party Pi is to receive privately from the dealer a piece of information
si so that s is reconstructible from any set of t+1 of the si, but no set of less than t
of the si supplies any information about s. The family of subsets of players that are
allowed to recover the secret is called access structure. We refer to this particular
case, where sets with more than t + 1 players are authorized to recover the secret,
as (t, n)- threshold access structures.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [14] realizes (t, n)-threshold access structures by
means of polynomial interpolation. We brieﬂy review it next:
Let Zq be a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q > n and let s ∈ Zq be the secret. The dealer
picks a polynomial P (x) of degree at most t, where the free term of P (x) is s and
all other coeﬃcients are selected from Zq, uniformly and independently, at random.






Every party Pi is publicly associated to a ﬁeld element αi. Distinct parties are
mapped to distinct ﬁeld elements. The dealer privately sends to party Pi the value




i , for i = 1, . . . , n.
Lets see that the scheme realizes a (t, n)-threshold access structure. Let us
assume the set of parties willing to recover the secret s is {P1, . . . , Pt+1}. The
secret s can be obtained from s1, . . . , st+1 as
∑t







It is not diﬃcult to prove that any set of less than t + 1 parties obtains no
information about s, that is, any secret is equally probable given the shares of this
set.
A generalization of Shamir secret sharing scheme has also been widely used
to distribute points on elliptic curves [2,1]. For our construction we will need to
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distribute the private keys in an ID-based scheme, that is private keys of the form
sQm, where Qm is a point on the elliptic curve. This is simply realized by sharing s
as in the previous paragraph and setting the products siQm to be the shares of the
secret sQm. Trivially, this realizes a (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme, since:
ΣλisiQm = (Σλisi)Qm = sQm.
3 Dynamic Distribution of Keys for ID-Based in
MANETs
In this section we provide a solution for the distribution of keys for ID-Based in a
mobile ad-hoc network. First of all, we describe the scenario we consider in this
paper and afterwards, we propose a solution ﬁtting our proposed scenario to provide
the corresponding private keys to new nodes joining the MANET.
3.1 Setting up the Scenario
Let N = {N1, . . . , Nm} be the set of possible nodes of a mobile ad-hoc network,
where m is an upper bound on the possible number of nodes.
Every node has an own unique identity ID, that must be bound to the node
for its entire lifetime, non transferable and veriﬁable. We will note the identity of
the node Ni as IDi. Identities of network nodes could be chosen in diﬀerent ways.
For example, [9] gives some diﬀerent options to choose the identities of the nodes,
distinguishing three cases of nodes an identity is bound to:
- a user operating a network node, i.e. the ID string corresponds to the user, e.g.
the user’s email address;
- a device, i.e. the ID is bound to the hardware, e.g. the MAC address;
- a network interface, in that case the ID might be derived from the IP address.
We assume that, initially, the MANET is composed by a set of nodes NF =
{N1, . . . , N}. These nodes are the founders of the MANET. Considering the high
probability that they meet each other at the time of MANET foundation, we assume
these nodes to be pairwise securely connected. If this is not the case, this fact can
be simulated by using some secure routing protocol technique [11].
We consider two diﬀerent types of nodes. On the one hand, a node that is able to
provide shares of the master key. We refer to this kind of node as a sharing master
node or simply as a node. We also consider nodes in the MANET that, although
connected to the set of nodes, are not able to provide shares of the master key. We
refer to these nodes as potential nodes.
Roughly speaking, in our proposal, founder nodes jointly generate shares of the
master key s. The way nodes generate this information will be described in detail
in Section 3.2. In this way, founder nodes become nodes of the MANET.
The use of the shares is two-fold: on the one hand, they will allow to provide to
a new node requiring its secret key, shares of it. On the other hand, if a new node
has received enough information from a subset of nodes in NF , this potential node
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becomes a node. With this technique, the set of nodes performing the task of the
PKG in a distributed manner spreads over the network dynamically.
We stress that our proposal specially suits the mobility condition of MANETs.
Indeed, a potential node may obtain a set of shares of its secret key from a set of
nodes. Even if it moves away, connecting in this way to a diﬀerent set of nodes
in the MANET, it can recover its private key after obtaining enough shares from
nodes in the MANET.
Due to space constraints, we focus on a honest-but-curious scenario. That is,
we assume that some set of corrupted nodes (either nodes or potential nodes) get
information from honest nodes but perform the protocol correctly. From now on,
we assume any set of corrupted nodes has cardinality at most t.
3.2 Dynamic ID-Based Keys in MANETs
Next we describe in detail our protocol. First of all we describe the part where
the founder nodes jointly create shares of the master key. Afterwards, we detail
the phase where a potential node connected to a node of the MANET requires a
share of its secret key to a set of nodes in the MANET. Finally, we show the phase
where a potential node turns into a master node after obtaining enough information
from a set of master nodes. We refer to these three phases as Initialization Phase,
Request and Computational Phase and Node Aggregation Phase respectively.
Initialization Phase This phase is performed only once in the protocol. Founders
of the MANET perform it at the beginning of the protocol. We assume the set
of founder nodes is NF = {N1, . . . , N}. This part of the protocol basically
consists of the joint generation of a random secret value in Zq. To do so, the
idea is that founders jointly set up a (t, )-threshold secret sharing scheme using
bivariate polynomials. Then, shares are univariate polynomials instead of ﬁeld
elements as in [14]. Although this fact increases the complexity of the protocol
depending on the chosen parameter t, it is necessary to provide dynamism to the
protocols, which is crucial in MANETs because of their inherent mobility and
unpredictability.
Note that we are considering the case where t < . If this is not the case, some
simple solutions can solve this problem. For example, founders can try to increase
the set of founder nodes or instead of this decrease the threshold t.
• Every node Ni, for i = 1, . . . , , chooses a random symmetric bivariate polyno-
mial P i(x, y) in variables x and y with degree at most t in each of them. We
write the polynomial as









j,k for any k, j = 0, . . . , t.
• Every node Ni, for any i = 1, . . . , , sends to the rest of founder nodes Nj ,
the univariate polynomial resulting of evaluating P i(x, y) in y = hj , where
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hj = h(IDj) for a hash function h : {0, 1}
∗ → Zq. That is, P
i(x, hj). We refer to













P j(x, hi) = P (x, hi).
The jointly generated random secret will be s =
∑
i=1 P
i(0, 0) = P (0, 0) and the
share of the secret of a node Ni will be the value si = Si(0) = P (0, hi).
It is not diﬃcult to check that the previous protocol realizes a (t, )-threshold
access structure.
Request and Computational Phase Let Nm be either a master key node or a
potential node with identity IDm willing to obtain the secret key that matches
with its public key Qm = H(IDm). The secret key will be dm = sQm, where s
is the secret that has been jointly generated by nodes in NF as described before.
In order to obtain its secret key, Nm must request a set of master nodes for his
secret key. After certain authentication, contacted nodes will provide it with
some pieces of information that will allow it to compute its secret key. More
speciﬁcally:
• Nm selects a group N˜m of at least t + 1 nodes from the set of neighbour nodes
Nm is connected with. Without loss of generality, we assume this set of nodes
is N˜m = {N1, . . . , Nt+1}.
• Nm requests its share of dm to every node in N˜m.
• Node Ni, for i = 1, . . . , t+1 sends to Nm the piece of information Q
i
priv = siQm.




priv, where the λi’s
are the appropriate Lagrange coeﬃcients.
Remark 1. Note that in case Nm is a founder node, then Nm only needs to
interact with a subset of t nodes in order to obtain enough shares to compute its
secret key dm.
Remark 2. If node Nm is connected to a number of nodes less than t + 1,
it can request its secret key dm to this set of nodes, and after obtaining the
corresponding sharing, use its mobility to connect to other diﬀerent nodes and
request for its secret key. In such a way, when Nm has t + 1 diﬀerent shares he
will be able to get the secret key in the same way as described before. We stress
that in this case, the mobile potential node does not have to request to a set of a
least t+1 nodes, but Nm can re-use previously obtained shares from other nodes.
Node Aggregation Phase Let Nm be either a master node or a potential node
with identity IDm as before. Potential nodes may turn into a master node if
they are connected to a set of at least t + 1 nodes and they request and receive
corresponding information from this set.
More speciﬁcally the protocol must be realized as follows:
• Nm selects a group N˜m of at least t + 1 nodes from the set of nodes Nm is
connected with. Without loss of generality, we assume this set of nodes is
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N˜m = {N1, . . . , Nt+1}.
• Ni requests to be accepted as a node.
• Node Ni, for i = 1, . . . , t+ 1 sends to Nm the piece of information P (hi, hm) =
Si(hm) = Sm(hi).
















P (hi, hm) = P (x, hm),
and compute its share of the secret s as sm = Sm(0).
4 Applications
In this section we point out some applications that derive from our construction.
Identity-Based Cryptography As a direct application of our construction,
nodes in a MANET can take advantage of the beneﬁts that Identity Based Public
Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) entails. For example, the ID-based signature scheme
of Cha and Cheon [4]. The problem of revoking users can be addressed by including
an expiry date in the identity corresponding to every node.
Threshold cryptography Most of threshold cryptography protocols use Shamir
secret sharing as building block. For example, threshold signature schemes combine
both secret sharing and digital signature schemes.
We suggest, as alternative, using algebraic properties of bivariate polynomials as
a building block for other threshold cryptography protocols over MANETs, rather
than the classic Shamir scheme.
Key Agreement The public keys of the nodes allow them to agree on a sym-
metric key. However, as was noted for example in [9], two nodes share the following
private information
K1mn = e(dm, Qn) = e(dn, Qm) = K1nm
in a non-interactive way. K1nm can be used as a symmetric key. Recall that
Qi = H(IDi) and di = sQi.
Saxena et al. in [13] suggest using K2nm = Sm(hn) = Sn(hm) as common secret
key. If the identities of the nodes include some expiry date, since K1nm depends
on the identities IDm, IDn, K1nm changes for every period, while K2nm remains
constant. Thus, a node can be compromised for a period without jeopardizing its
communications for future periods.
Veriﬁability and Traceability Veriﬁability is easy to implement, since the
founder nodes must sign a group key including Ppub = sP , and after reconstructing
its private key dm, node Nm can easily check whether e(Ppub, Qm) = e(P, dm).
Traceability can also be implemented with the usual veriﬁable secret sharing (see
for example [13]).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a method to distribute among a set of nodes the role of
the private key generator in a mobile ad-hoc network. In such a way that, not only
initial sharing holder nodes can provide shares of the master key, but also new nodes
joining the network, if certain connection constraints are satisﬁed.
On top of all the natural features of Identity Based schemes, our proposal also
provides a non-interactive pairwise key agreement. Techniques on bivariate polyno-
mials may also apply to other distributed dynamic protocols.
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